EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER SOME JURISDICTIONS: HAMMOND V. KMART AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION by Quevedo, Juan
111 
 
EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER SOME JURISDICTIONS: 
HAMMOND V. KMART AND THE ENDORSEMENT OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
Juan C. Quevedo Gutierrez∗ 
 
Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360 (1st Cir. 2013) 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.	   Introduction ................................................................................ 111	  
II.	   The Birth of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .................................................. 114	  
III.	   Hammond v. Kmart .................................................................. 117	  
IV.	   Other Circuit Courts ................................................................ 119	  
A.	   District Courts ....................................................................... 121	  
B.	   Application ............................................................................ 122	  
V.	   Unreasonable Approaches to § 1981 ........................................ 124	  
VI.	   Conclusion ............................................................................... 125	  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Close your eyes and imagine yourself as an African-American 
woman.1  You are in your late thirties and have two children.2  You do 
not have a driver’s license because you do not drive a car.3  Instead, 
you use an identification card issued to you by the State of 
Massachusetts for residents who do not drive.4  On November 21, 
2012, one day before Thanksgiving, you take your children shopping 
for Christmas presents.5  You go to a Kmart store in Braintree, 
Massachusetts, because it is easily accessible by public transportation.6  
                                                 
 
∗Candidate for J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law, 2016.  Mr. Quevedo 
Gutierrez is from Palmdale, California and received his Bachelor of Arts in Political 
Science from California State University, Northridge.    
1 The following scenario derives its facts directly from Hammond v. Kmart Corp. 
733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013). 
2 Id.  
3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hammond, 733 F.3d 360 (No. 13-998), 2014 
WL 662136, at *3. 
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
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In addition, you shop at Kmart because you want to take advantage of 
Kmart’s Layaway Program.7   
Once your children have picked out their Christmas presents, 
you take their presents to the layaway counter.8  You had a rather 
uneventful experience shopping at Kmart until you hand your 
identification card to the Kmart sales clerk.9  To your surprise, the 
sales clerk barrages you with racist insults while putting your 
children’s Christmas presents on layaway.10   
Among many things, the sales clerk asks you if you are going 
to be “‘jumping the counter’ to get what [you need]” and refers to your 
identification card as a “liquor ID.”11  After this conversation, imagine 
how you would feel with your children listening to every word the 
sales clerk has uttered.  You—in this imaginary world—are a “porch 
monkey,”12 and no one is reaching out to help you.  Instead, even the 
courts—while not endorsing this type of behavior—find that the law is 
not on your side.13  But in an effort to avoid further incident in front of 
your children, you bite your tongue and proceed with the layaway 
purchase and hope that one day you will receive justice.14  
Now open your eyes and realize that your imagination is the 
reality of Chenell Hammond (Hammond), the plaintiff in Hammond v. 
Kmart Corp.15  The sales clerk at Kmart harassed Hammond because 
she was an African-American woman.16  Hammond, who has 
experienced discrimination because of her race in retail stores, has few 
legal remedies.  A circuit split regarding the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
in the retail setting allowed Hammond’s disparate treatment.  The 
First,17 Fifth,18 Seventh,19 Eighth,20 and Eleventh Circuits21 “have 
                                                 
 
7 Id. “In a layaway transaction a retailer agrees to hold merchandise, which a 
customer secures by making a deposit.  The customer can retain the merchandise 
once the price is paid in full.”  Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361 n.1.  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 968 (9th ed. 2009). 
8 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361. 
12 Id.  
13 See id. at 365. 
14 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 5. 
15 733 F.3d at 360. 
16 Id. at 361. 
17 See, e.g., id. at 362 (explaining that in order “[t]o state a claim under § 1981, a 
plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant 
discriminated against her on the basis of her race; and (3) the discrimination 
implicated one or more of the activities listed in the statute, including the right to 
make and enforce contracts”). 
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added an extra-textual element to the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”22  
According to these circuits, a defendant violates § 1981 only when his 
or her discriminatory conduct prevents the plaintiff from completing a 
transaction.23  In contrast, according to the Third24 and Sixth 
Circuits,25 a defendant violates § 1981 when he or she treats the 
plaintiff in a markedly hostile manner during the course of the 
transaction, even if the plaintiff nevertheless completes the 
transaction.26  Although the Third and Sixth Circuits may be 
outnumbered, their interpretations of § 1981 remain most faithful to its 
text27 and to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.28 
                                                                                                                   
 
18 See, e.g., Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir. 2001)) (explaining 
that in order to state a claim under § 1981 for discrimination in the retail setting, the 
plaintiff “‘must offer evidence of . . . an attempt to contract’ . . . [which was] in some 
way . . . ‘thwarted’”).  
19 See, e.g., Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that 
the plaintiffs did not have an actionable claim under § 1981 because “[t]hey were 
denied neither admittance nor service”). 
20 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 
2001) (affirming that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1981 because the 
plaintiff had completed the purchase).  
21 See, e.g., Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that a Hispanic customer cannot state a claim under § 1981 when he “was able to 
complete his transaction”).   
22 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2.  
23 Id.   
24 See, e.g., Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d. Cir. 1978) (holding that it 
was enough to state a § 1981 claim when plaintiff “received disparate, and because it 
was based on race, disparaging treatment for which the record [offered] no 
justification”). 
25 See, e.g., Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that a plaintiff could claim a § 1981 violation in the retail setting by proving 
that he “received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a 
reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory”). 
26 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
27 Id. at 2.   
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, given evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009).  
28 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  “That all . . . citizens of the United 
States . . . , of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of 
slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”  Id.   
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The purpose of this comment is to discuss how the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is moving away from the 
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Part II 
will discuss the development of § 1981.  Part III will discuss the First 
Circuit’s Hammond case.  Part IV will discuss court decisions contrary 
to Hammond and hypothesize as to how Hammond would have been 
resolved had the case been tried in the Third or Sixth Circuit.  Finally, 
Part V will discuss why the approach in Hammond is unreasonable for 
analyzing a claim under §1981.   
  
II. THE BIRTH OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
 
Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment on December 6, 
1865.29  In response, Southern states enacted “Black Codes” designed 
to “recreat[e] conditions of slavery for newly freed African Americans 
through acts of private discrimination.”30  Thus, Congress sought to 
“reconstruct[] Southern minds” to make them recognize “that the 
abolition of slavery had created an economic and social vacuum in the 
South.”31  As a result, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.32  
The Equal Rights Under the Law provision of the Act read in part: 
 
[C]itizens of the United States . . . , of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of 
slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same 
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . 
. .33 
 
 Ultimately, the Equal Rights Under the Law provision of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 became today’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981, outlining 
the right to contract, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, outlining the right to 
                                                 
 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
30 Charlotte H. Sanders, Come Down and Make Bargains in Good Faith: The 
Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Race and National Origin Discrimination in 
Retail Stores, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 281, 285 (2007).  
31 Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper 
Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 548 (1989).  
32 Sanders, supra note 30, at 285. 
33 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  
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purchase, hold, and sell real and personal property.34  The principal 
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to give “real content to 
the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.”35 
 Years later, courts held that § 1981 not only covers public acts 
of discrimination, but also private acts of discrimination.  For example, 
in Runyon v. McCrary, Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales, two 
African-American students, sued Russell and Katheryne Runyon, the 
proprietors of a private school, for denying them admission to the 
private school based on the students’ race.36  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted injunctive relief for 
the students and awarded their parents compensatory damages.37  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
affirmed the district court’s holding,38  and the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed.39  The central question for the Court was “whether § 
1981 prohibit[ed] private, commercially operated, nonsectarian 
schools from denying admission to prospective students because they 
are [African-American].”40  In answering the question in the 
affirmative, the Court held that the argument “that § 1981 does not 
reach private acts of racial discrimination . . . is wholly inconsistent 
with . . . the legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.”41  For that reason, the Court held that § 1981 reaches private 
conduct.42 
 But in 1989, the Supreme Court restricted the definition of § 
1981’s use of the phrase “make and enforce” contracts.43  For 
example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, Brenda Patterson, a 
female African-American employee, sued McLean Credit Union 
(McLean) for employment discrimination based on her race.44  The 
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina 
agreed with McLean that a claim for racial harassment was not 
                                                 
 
34 Sanders, supra note 30, at 286.  
35 Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer 
Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 123 (2005) (citing Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433 (1968)).  
36 427 U.S. 160, 164 (1976).  
37 Id. at 166. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 186.  
40 Id. at 168.  
41 Id. at 173.  
42 Id.  
43 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (restricting racial 
harassment claims in an employment setting from being recognized under § 1981). 
44 Id. at 169. 
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actionable under § 1981.45  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.46  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal of Patterson’s 
racial harassment claim as not actionable.47  In this case, Patterson 
alleged that McLean harassed her, failed to promote her, and 
ultimately fired her because of her race.48  Therefore, the question was 
whether a victim of work-place racial harassment could file a claim 
under § 1981.49  In answering this question, the Court stated that “[t]he 
most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its scope 
forbidding discrimination in the ‘mak[ing] and enforce[ment]’ of 
contracts alone.”50  Therefore, “[w]here an alleged act of 
discrimination does not involve the impairment of [making or 
enforcing a contract], § 1981 provides no relief.”51  In other words, 
“the harassment and discrimination that [Patterson] suffered fell 
outside § 1981’s coverage because it took place after the initial 
formation of the employment contract,”52 and “postformation conduct 
does not involve the right to make [or enforce] a contract.”53 
 In response to “[Pattterson]’s narrow construction of the 
nation’s oldest and most important civil rights statutes,”54 Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55  Specifically, Congress added 
subsections (b) and (c) so that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 now reads: 
 
(a) Statement of equal rights 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens 
. . . . 
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined 
For the purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce 
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and 
                                                 
 
45 Id. at 169-70.  
46 Id. at 170.  
47 Id. at 189. 
48 Id. at 169.  
49 Id. at 170. 
50 Id. at 176 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009)).  
51 Id.  
52 Sanders, supra note 30, at 290.  
53 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.  
54 Richardson, supra note 35, at 129.  
55 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009)).     
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termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 
(c) Protection against impairment 
The rights protected by this section are protected against 
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and 
impairment under color of State law.56  
 
In a later memorandum, Congress stated that “[t]he list set 
forth in subsection (b) is illustrative only, and should be given broad 
construction to allow a remedy for any act of intentional 
discrimination committed in the making or the performance of a 
contract.”57  In other words, the list in subsection (b) “should only be a 
starting point, a floor, rather than a ceiling.”58 
 
III. HAMMOND V. KMART 
 
Although Congress negated the holding of Patterson with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts continue to interpret § 1981 in the 
retail setting as if Congress had never amended it.59  Specifically, 
courts are narrowly interpreting § 1981 by “focusing exclusively on 
the ‘make and enforce’ clause and acknowledging only a few 
actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions under subsection 
(b).”60  Specifically, courts have added an extra-textual element to the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof by requiring that the defendant’s 
discriminatory conduct prevented the plaintiff from completing a 
transaction.61 
In Hammond v. Kmart Corp., Hammond filed a lawsuit against 
Kmart Corporation (Kmart), bringing a § 198162 claim of racial 
discrimination.63  The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts granted Kmart’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
Hammond “fail[ed] to make any factual averments to support a claim 
that the store clerk’s comments, described as ‘racially demeaning, 
insulting, rude, and discriminatory,’ precluded [Hammond] from 
making or enforcing her layaway contract with Kmart.”64  The United 
                                                 
 
56 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009). 
57 137 CONG. REC. 29,046 (1991).  
58 Sanders, supra note 30, at 305.  
59 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 21. 
60 Sanders, supra note 30, at 295.  
61 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 
62 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2009). 
63 733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013).  
64 Id. at 362. 
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision, holding that to state a § 1981 claim, “the alleged 
discrimination must interfere in some way” with a contractual 
relationship.65  The facts in Hammond are not disputed: Hammond 
entered into and performed a contract with Kmart while a Kmart’s 
sales clerk barraged Hammond with racist insults.66  In affirming 
Hammond’s dismissal, the First Circuit noted that the pivotal question 
was whether Hammond “was actually denied the ability either to 
make, perform, enforce, modify, or terminate a contract, or to enjoy 
the fruits of a contractual relationship, by reason of race-based 
animus.”67  Answering this question, the court held that Hammond did 
not “allege that [she] was unable to complete her layaway transaction . 
. . [or] that the Kmart’s sales clerk refused to help Hammond, forced 
Hammond to use something other than the normal layaway procedure, 
or otherwise contracted with Hammond on different terms than other 
customers.”68  In other words, “[t]here is no claim that Hammond did 
not receive the purchases she had placed on layaway.”69  The First 
Circuit explained that a § 1981 claim “must allege the actual loss of a 
contract interest.”70  Because Hammond alleged only discriminatory 
treatment during the course of an otherwise successfully completed 
contract, the First Circuit found that the district court properly 
dismissed Hammond’s complaint.71  
The First Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he scope of § 1981’s 
coverage has changed over time.”72  Specifically, the court noted that 
Congress amended § 1981 in 1991 to negate the holding of Patterson, 
which had interpreted § 1981 to prohibit discrimination only in the 
making and enforcement of contracts, and not in the performance of 
contracts.73  The court pointed out that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amended the statutory phrase “make and enforce contracts” to include 
the “performance” of contracts, as well as the “enjoyment of all 
benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”74  Although the amendment expanded the coverage of § 
1981, the court nevertheless concluded that this statutory language was 
                                                 
 
65 Id. at 364 (citing Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
66 Id. at 361. 
67 Id. at 362 (emphasis omitted) (citing Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100-01). 
68 Id. at 364. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 365 (citing Garrett, 295 F.3d at 102). 
71 Id. at 366. 
72 Id. at 362. 
73 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 362-363.  
74 Id. at 363 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2009)). 
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not broad enough to encompass the discriminatory comments the sales 
clerk made to Hammond.75   
The ramifications of the district court’s decision upon victims 
of discrimination are clear.  As mentioned before, to state a § 1981 
claim, the alleged discrimination has to interfere in some way with the 
right to make and enforce a contract.76  The requirement of 
interference wrongly fails to focus on the victim of discrimination and 
rather focuses on the person discriminating.  For example, if 
Hammond decided not to place her children’s Christmas presents on 
layaway because of racial epithets, although the sales clerk was willing 
to place them on hold, albeit in a hostile manner, could Hammond 
have stated a claim under § 1981?  Courts have answered that question 
in the negative.  For example, in Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., where a 
sales clerk barraged the plaintiffs with racist insults, the court held that 
the plaintiffs could not recover under § 1981 because the plaintiffs 
voluntarily chose not to make the purchase.77  Therefore, when the 
sales clerk barraged Hammond with racist insults, she had two options: 
(1) voluntarily walk away and lose the opportunity to bring a lawsuit, 
or (2) proceed with the layaway purchase and face humiliation.  To 
state a § 1981 claim, Hammond had to allege that the Kmart sales 
clerk prevented her from completing her layaway transaction, “refused 
to help [her], forced [her] to use something other than normal layaway 
procedure, or otherwise contracted with [her] on different terms than 
other customers.”78 
 
IV. OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS 
 
Other circuit courts have held that “discriminatory harassment 
of a contractual customer violates § 1981 whether or not such 
harassment ‘blocks’ or ‘thwarts’ the formation of a contract.”79  For 
example, in Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Lois Christian, an 
African-American customer, sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) 
for accusing her of shoplifting and asking her to leave the store.80  The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted 
summary judgment for Wal-Mart.81  However, the United States Court 
                                                 
 
75 Id. at 364. 
76 Id. at 365. 
77 330 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). 
78 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 364. 
79 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hammond, 733 F.3d 360 (No. 13-998), 2014 WL 
1260528, at *2.  
80 252 F.3d 862, 864 (6th Cir. 2001). 
81 Id. at 866.  
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Wal-Mart.82  In doing so, the Sixth Circuit held 
that to establish a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must prove that: 
 
(1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 
(2) plaintiff sought to make or enforce a contract for services 
ordinarily provided by the defendant; and  
(3) . . . plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile 
manner and in a manner which a reasonable person 
would find objectively discriminatory.83   
 
Therefore, § 1981 claims in the Sixth Circuit may survive when an 
employee subjects a customer to race discrimination, regardless of 
whether the discrimination prevents the customer from completing a 
transaction.84  The Sixth Circuit noted that this is the most useful test 
for courts when evaluating claims of race discrimination because it 
accounts “for situations in the commercial establishment context in 
which a plaintiff cannot identify other similarly situated persons” 
outside of the protected class.85  
Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that a customer can bring 
a § 1981 claim if the customer experienced discrimination, even if the 
customer successfully completed the transaction.86  For example, 
in Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, Arthur Hall, an African-
American man sued the Pennsylvania State Police Department and a 
local bank for implementing a policy in which they targeted only 
African-American customers for their concerted program of 
photographing “suspicious-looking” individuals.87  The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Hall’s 
discrimination claim.88  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s holding.89  In doing so, the 
Third Circuit held that, although the police department’s 
discriminatory program did not prevent the plaintiff from completing 
his banking transactions, he nevertheless stated a claim against the 
bank under § 1981 because he received disparate and disparaging 
treatment that was based on race for which the record offers no 
                                                 
 
82 Id. at 880. 
83 Id. at 872.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 871.  
86 See Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1978). 
87 Id. at 88. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 92. 
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justification.90  Although the disparate treatment did not thwart the 
plaintiff from entering into a contract with the bank, the plaintiff’s 
"disparaging treatment [based on race] for which the record offers no 
justification," was enough to state a claim under § 1981.91 
 
A. District Courts 
 
Other courts have also found that a § 1981 claim exists when 
the customer forms a contract, but with unequal privileges, benefits, 
terms, or conditions.  For example, in Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms 
Dairy, Inc., Rathea Williams, an African-American woman, sued 
Cloverleaf Farms Dairy, Inc. (Cloverleaf), because Cloverleaf violated 
her right to buy items free from race discrimination.92  The United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland found for Williams.93  
In this case, Williams attempted to make a purchase but was met with 
racial slurs instead.94  After some delay, another cashier completed 
Williams’s sale.95  In doing so, the district court held that “[a]lthough 
Williams was eventually able to purchase items from another cashier, 
the Court refuses to find that this delay in completing the transaction, 
coupled with alleged racial attack, is insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish a violation of § 1981.”96  In other words, “the combination of 
the delay and the racial slurs constituted an alteration in the contract’s 
terms and conditions.”97 
Although Williams is persuasive, rather than authoritative, for 
the First Circuit, it nonetheless has merit.  For example, ten years 
before Williams, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union.98  In Patterson, Justice Brennan, concurring, viewed 
post-formation discriminatory conduct as a demonstration that a 
contract was not really made on equal terms.99  Justice Brennan 
provided the following example: 
 
[I]f an employer offers a black and a white applicant for 
employment the same written contract, but then tells the 
                                                 
 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 78 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482-83 (D. Md. 1999).  
93 Id. at 485.  
94 Id. at 483.  
95 Id. at 485.  
96 Id.  
97 Sanders, supra note 30, at 298.  
98 491 U.S. 164 (1988).  
99 Id. at 207-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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black employee that her working conditions will be 
much worse than those of the white hired for the same 
job because “there’s a lot of harassment going on in this 
workplace and you have to agree to that,” it would have 
to be concluded that the white and black had not 
enjoyed an equal right to make a contract.100 
 
Connecting Justice Brennan’s hypothetical to retail contracts, 
Charlotte H. Sanders, a professor of law at Georgia State University 
College of Law, suggests that “because it is nearly impossible to make 
a purchase without interacting with some store personnel, the quality 
of the service provided by that personnel must then be part of the 
customer’s contract with the store.”101  Therefore: 
 
[t]he retail store analog to Justice Brennan’s 
hypothetical job offer is a circumstance in which a 
retailer states to customers, “you can make purchases in 
my store, but if you are African American, Latin[ 
American], or Asian American, you will have to suffer 
racial harassment in order to do so.”102  
 
B. Application 
 
If Hammond had lived in the Third or Sixth Circuits,103 the 
outcome of her case would have been different.  Analyzing 
Hammond’s case under the Sixth Circuit test, it is easy to conclude 
that Hammond meets the first two prongs of the test.104  First, as an 
African-American woman, she is a member of a protected class.105  
Second, there is no trouble concluding that Hammond made herself 
available to enter into a contractual relationship for services ordinarily 
                                                 
 
100 Id. at 208. 
101 Sanders, supra note 30, at 314 (footnote omitted).  
102 Id.  
103 The Third Circuit comprises the States of Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania.  Court Locator, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited March 30, 2015).  The Sixth 
Circuit comprises the States of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.  Id. 
104 Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001) (identifying 
the first two prongs in a commercial establishment case as: “(1) plaintiff is a member 
of a protected class; [and] (2) plaintiff sought to make or enforce a contract for 
services ordinarily provided by the defendant”). 
105 Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 2013) (“It is undisputed 
that Hammond, an African-American, is a member of a racial minority.”). 
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provided by Kmart.106  Therefore, the remainder of the analysis will 
focus on the third part of the Sixth Circuit test: whether Hammond 
received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner that a 
reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.107   
Here, Hammond was at Kmart with her two children.108   
 
In order to place several items on layaway, she needed 
to give the sales clerk her identification card, which 
indicated she lived in Roxbury, Massachusetts, a part of 
Boston which has a high percentage of African-
American residents.  Upon receiving this identification 
card, the white sales clerk asked if Hammond would be 
“jumping the counter to get what she needed because 
she is from Roxbury.”  The clerk also labeled the 
identification card [as] a “liquor ID.”109   
 
The clerk then commented that she used to live near Roxbury, “but 
had to move because of ‘porch monkeys’ in that area.”110  “Hammond 
was ‘humiliated and deeply offended’ by the [clerk’s] comments, 
which she believed reflected the sales clerk’s belief that [Hammond] 
was ‘poor, inferior and violent . . . because she is African 
American.’”111  The facts show that Hammond raised a genuine issue 
of fact that she received services in a markedly hostile manner.  
Further, the clerk’s treatment of Hammond was hostile and objectively 
discriminatory because it was profoundly contrary to the financial 
interests of Kmart and far outside of widely accepted business norms.   
Kmart may argue, however, that the clerk had legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for uttering racial epithets towards Hammond.  
For example, Kmart may argue that the clerk suspected that Hammond 
would “jump the counter.”112  But that argument fails because 
Hammond can prove that she was a victim of intentional 
                                                 
 
106 Id. at 361. 
107 Christian, 252 F.3d at 872 (providing the third prong: “(3) plaintiff was denied 
the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits or privileges of the contractual 
relationship in that (a) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated 
persons outside the protected class were not and/or (b) plaintiff received services in a 
markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find 
objectively discriminatory”). 
108 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 This justification is used for illustrative purposes and is not intended to exhaust all 
of the possible justifications Kmart may have raised. 
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discrimination by showing that (1) Kmart’s stated reason had no basis 
in fact, (2) the stated reason was not the actual reason, and (3) that the 
stated reason was not sufficient to explain the clerk’s actions.113  First, 
the clerk had no basis in fact because Hammond did not “jump the 
counter.”  Second, it is reasonable to believe that the clerk did not 
actually believe that Hammond would “jump the counter” because the 
clerk took no further action, such as calling the police or security.  
Third, the fact that Hammond is from Roxbury was not sufficient to 
believe that Hammond would “jump the counter.”  Therefore, once we 
eliminate Kmart’s justifications, discrimination may well be the most 
likely alternative explanation, especially since Kmart was in the best 
position to explain its actions but failed to do so.  
Analyzing Hammond’s case under the Third Circuit test,114 it is 
clear that Hammond received disparaging treatment based on race for 
which the record offers no justification.  Hammond was an African-
American woman, and the clerk began barraging Hammond upon 
discovering that she resided in Roxbury.115  Further, as described 
above, the record in Hammond offers no justification for Hammond’s 
disparate treatment.  Thus, because § 1981 obligates Kmart to extend 
the same treatment to Hammond as enjoyed by white citizens, 
Hammond would have stated a § 1981 claim in the Third Circuit.   
 
V. UNREASONABLE APPROACHES TO § 1981 
 
Courts that interpret § 1981 narrowly do so out of fear that, 
without limits, § 1981 will become a “generalized anti-discrimination 
law that would regulate a wide variety of private behavior.”116  In 
Hammond, for example, the First Circuit held that § 1981 “does not 
provide a general cause of action for race discrimination.”117  
According to the First Circuit, “to state a [§ 1981] claim a plaintiff 
must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ . . . under 
which the plaintiff has rights.”118  Otherwise, the First Circuit states, 
“§ 1981 would become a catch-all remedy to racial discrimination, 
                                                 
 
113 See Christian, 252 F.3d at 879.  
114 See Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating it is enough to 
state a § 1981 claim when plaintiff “received disparate, and because it was based on 
race, disparaging treatment for which the record [offered] no justification”). 
115 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 361. 
116 Sanders, supra note 30, at 301. 
117 Hammond, 733 F.3d at 364 (citing Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 783 F.3d 533, 538 
(8th Cir. 2007)). 
118 Id. (emphasis omitted) (additional internal quotations omitted) (citing Domino’s 
Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006)).  
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‘produci[ng] satellite . . . litigation of immense scope.”119  However, 
Congress negated the holding of Patterson and amended § 1981 to 
prohibit discrimination in all aspects of contracting.120  And “[r]ead 
literally, the statute prohibits only discrimination in the making and 
performance of contracts, so is not a catch-all remedy to racial 
discrimination.121  In addition, and as mentioned in Christian v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., the defendant can shift the burden of proof back to 
the plaintiff by showing that the defendant had a legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason for acting the way it did.122  Thus, although 
courts’ attention to limiting § 1981 may be reasonable, “courts have 
responded to a reasonable fear in an unreasonable way.”123 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The decision in Hammond endorses discrimination.  Hammond 
acknowledges that there is discrimination in the world, and that it is 
best not to address it.  But it is those that discriminate that deserve our 
contempt.  America has gained very little by not confronting 
discrimination.  It is only when we confront discrimination that it wilts 
in the power of justice.  The Hammond decision not only reflects the 
view of a circuit fearful of creating satellite litigation, and a case 
ignored by the Supreme Court in its denial of certiorari,124 but it also 
reflects a precedent, setting the terms for appropriate behavior in the 
First Circuit.  How will Kmart advise its employees to treat its 
customers of African-American, Latin American, or Asian American 
descent, or any other racial minority in the future?  How will other 
department stores advise their employees?  How many more 
Hammonds will have to deal with discrimination without legal 
remedies?  This decision permits discrimination to continue without 
redress for millions of American consumers who are racially profiled, 
harassed, or, like Hammond, simply required to endure painfully 
substandard service so that they may be able to purchase toys for their 
kids.   
                                                 
 
119 Id. (citing Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 479). 
120 See discussion supra Part II. 
121 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 23.  
122 252 F.3d 862, 879 (6th Cir. 2001) (providing that “[a]fter the defendant produces 
evidence of its non-discriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of 
discrimination falls away and the production burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who 
must prove by a preponderance that the defendant’s stated reason was not its true 
reason, but was a pretext for discrimination”). 
123 Sanders, supra note 30, at 302. 
124 Hammond, 733 F.3d 360, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1889 (2014).  
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